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1. Prologue
When doing research, perhaps once in a life time you find some-
thing special, like the perfect diamond, or the perfect case. This 
diamond, or case, has some special properties that, when you see 
them you know you have been looking for them without know-
ing it. The case presented in this article – the development of 
the Norwegian company Opera Software especially in relation to 
Africa and Nigeria - is such a perfect case, at least for the more 
senior researcher. It is a perfect example of a company within a 
business landscape dominated by network processes. One spe-
cific network feature is the existence of specific connections due 
to embeddedness and this is at the centre of the development of 
the case. The company we will follow is both very lucky and 
successful in its networking processes dealing with these con-
nections. One basic reason for the existence of embeddedness 
and specific connections is that the involved resources are het-
erogeneous, making the interfaces between them important for 
their use. The involved actors are constantly trying to develop 
these interfaces, in order to better use all resources. This is what 
makes this company so lucky. The existing  specific connections 
influences both the acting itself as well as the outcome of the 
acting. First, the development of a company in such a business 
landscape directly depends on the success of its related partners. 
Second, it is also dependent on the company’s ability to get close 
to the basic dimensions behind the embeddedness, which often, 
as in this case, are technological features and connections. A 
third factor is how these specific connections can be economized 
from the focal company’s point of view. There are only some of 
the dimensions in the totality that can be transformed into the 
financial dimension. 
All three of these aspects are central issues in the Opera Soft-
ware case. First we will briefly describe the theoretical and meth-
odological approach used when investigating and designing the 
case before presenting it in sections 3 to 8. In section 9, we will 
come back to the central features of the case and the strategic sit-
uation of a company in a world dominated by network processes.
2. Theoretical and methodological approach
The industrial network theory will be used here to analyze the 
development of Opera in Africa. This theory argues that innova-
tion and growth are the result of complex and substantial interac-
tions among firms leading to business relationships (Håkansson 
1987; Håkansson et al. 2009). These business relationships can 
be analysed using the Activity-Resource-Actor (ARA) model 
(Håkansson and Johanson 1992). The model illustrates the com-
plex content and inter-connectedness of a relationship by di-
viding it into layers of actors, resources and activities. Often a 
relationship is dominated by one of the layers, but it is the inter-
play among these layers that defines the relationship. The model 
also illustrates how an actor, activity or resource always exists 
in several contexts on different levels; within the company, in a 
business relationship and in the wider network (Håkansson et 
al. 2009; Håkansson and Snehota 1995). It is a framework that 
can be applied in order to clarify how certain qualitative aspects 
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of networks, such as embeddedness, relatedness and interdepen-
dence, are influencing the way actors can behave or how prod-
ucts and services are assessed. It is a way to identify critical 
relative dimensions and their effects. This model was used to 
structure the data collection regarding the development of Opera 
and its context.
The research has been carried out as an explorative and em-
pirically grounded case study. We have aimed at describing, un-
derstanding and explaining the process behind Opera Software’s 
massive growth in some special countries in Africa – especially 
Nigeria. We wanted to learn about the interactions, relationships 
and networks that led to, and were subsequently created and 
continued to play out in, the process. Based on this approach 
the purpose of the research was to document and analyze the 
case based on rich empirical, context-dependent data. Our aim 
is to provide qualitative and semantic explanations by taking an 
interpretive and narrative approach. 
Interviews are the main data source. Nineteen informal and 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with Opera employ-
ees, previous Opera employees, users of Opera’s products and 
others knowledgeable about Nigeria, such as natives, expats, 
and experts. The interviews were carried out face-to-face when 
possible, and through video conferencing, utilizing Skype and 
Opera Software, when practical circumstances such as distance 
and time dictated it. See appendix A for a detailed list of the 
interviews performed and how, where and when they were con-
ducted. The interviews were primarily recorded and transcribed, 
with only a few exceptions where detailed notes were taken in-
stead. 
The case has guided us in selecting informants through snow-
ball sampling (Berg and Lune 2012, 52). When an interview was 
completed, the informant was asked to suggest other relevant 
interview subjects. In this way, the informants helped us map 
out the network and led us to other relevant informants in the 
context of the case. 
To understand the case context, we based our study on a mix 
of informants. Some are Nigerians or Africans who can explain 
regional matters and affairs with the insights and limitations of 
their native backgrounds and local presence. Others include Ni-
gerian expats who relocated to Norway and have been abroad 
long enough to see their own country from the outside, and some 
Norwegian experts.
We also used user statistics provided by Opera Software. We 
studied the numbers documenting user uptake and growth in Ni-
geria, the most popular web sites visited by the users, handsets 
used and data consumption. These served as useful data for un-
derstanding, analyzing and framing the use of Opera’s solution 
in Nigeria. 
Secondary data and documents were used to complement and 
verify the primary sources. To gain an initial overview of Op-
era Software, we studied the annual reports, financial reports, 
quarterly reports and press releases from 2000 - 2012. Opera 
also publishes a monthly report called the State of the Mobile 
Web (SMW), which also proved valuable to verify facts. All of 
these reports helped us understand the basics of the organiza-
tions, their history and growth, and served as useful background 
data when interviewing employees from Opera HQ. In addition, 
official reports and statistics served as a supplement to help us 
understand more of the context and details of the case.  
Annual reports, financial reports and press releases were used 
with care. These are conducted for very specific purposes and 
within strict frameworks, and are created for investors and PR 
purposes. The same applies to reports issued by organizations 
such as the United Nations (UN), McKinsey, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU). They represent only a small part of the case, and 
were used mainly for an initial understanding of the company 
and the company context. We found it particularly important to 
rely on Nigerian respondents in describing the context, to avoid 
the stereotypical and often very simplified version of reality.  
3. Introduction to the case 
In the wake of the Arab Spring of North Africa and the Middle 
East in 2011, it is plain to see that the Internet can be a cata-
lyst for change. The populations of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and 
several other nations were able to better communicate, organize 
activities and talk to the outside world through social media and 
mobile Internet access. The Norwegian company, Opera Soft-
ware, played a significant role in the midst of these events and 
experienced a 900% increase overnight in Egypt during the most 
intense phase of the revolution. Opera also immediately climbed 
to become one of the ten most popular brands in the country 
(Interview with Opera’s marketing manager).
Africa may be its own continent, but it is still part of the global 
world. This was the experience of Opera, which suddenly, with-
out any effort, became an important supplier in Africa. Their 
mobile web browser solution currently has a major share of the 
African users. 
Opera Software originated from a research project that was 
initiated in 1994 at Telenor, a telecommunications company in 
Oslo. Despite interesting results, Telenor decided to terminate 
the project as it did not fit with their priorities at the time. Jon 
von Tetzchner and Geir Ivarsøy, who had worked on the proj-
ect, decided to leave Telenor and founded Opera Software as an 
independent company in 1995. They continued to develop the 
technology and launched a web browser in 1996 (Annual report 
2000). A web browser, also simply referred to as a browser, is a 
software application necessary to display, locate, navigate and 
search for content on the Internet. 
In 2000, Opera experienced their commercial breakthrough 
with the browser Opera 4.0 for Windows. This browser was 
downloaded more than 1 million times the first month after 
launch, and Opera soon became the third largest browser after 
the well-established American competitors, Microsoft’s Internet 
Explorer and AOL’s Netscape Navigator, in terms of users (An-
nual report 2000). This did not go unnoticed and Time magazine 
commented in 2001: 
“It has to be one of the strangest business plans in the history 
of the Internet. A small software company based in remote Nor-
way takes on two of the biggest powers in computing, Microsoft 
and Netscape. Odder still, this tiny firm enters a market – Web 
browsers – in which the competition gives away its products for 
free. Are these guys crazy? (Time magazine 2001)”
Also in 2000, approximately eight percent of the world’s 
population had access to the Internet, mainly through PCs. But 
Opera expected that users would access the Internet in several 
different ways in the future and increasingly access the Internet 
through convenient handheld devices. With this as a backdrop, 
Opera acquired the Swedish company Hern Labs AB in 2000. 
This was a company that specialized in cross-platform technolo-
gies, located at the heart of the Swedish cutting-edge area for 
development of mobile communications technology (www.op-
era.com). This strengthened Opera’s possibilities for developing 
solutions not only for computers, but also for a range of new 
devices such as feature phones, smart phones, tablets and TVs. 
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Early on, Opera decided to invest in HTML and Web technol-
ogy, including handheld mobile Internet devices. This decision 
was made when it was highly uncertain whether the World Wide 
Web or the Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) would survive 
and become the industry standard. WAP was initially intended 
for mobile phones and was a simplified, alternative technology 
compared to the web. Neither WAP nor the Web could provide a 
satisfactory user experience on mobile phones in the early days. 
WAP was too simple, and the Web was too big to run on the 
available mobile handsets. Because Opera had invested heavily 
in its Web-based desktop platform, it never implemented WAP 
technology. Opera strongly believed WAP was inferior, and im-
plementing it would go against the company DNA. History has 
shown that ‘the best solution’ is not always the one that will 
survive, and at the time WAP was a real threat to the future exis-
tence of the Web. Instead, Opera developed Opera Mini, a small 
and fast proxy-based web browser. That way, it could deliver the 
full Internet and an improved user experience to a range of new 
devices, including basic feature phones (Interview with Opera’s 
former CTO).
By the end of 2011, Opera had 777 employees, 897 MNOK in 
revenue, and 142 MNOK in profits, and could offer a selection 
of free web browser products for the end-user (Annual report 
2011). The four main browser categories were:
Opera for Desktops, first launched in 1996, intended for per-
sonal computers. Reached 60 million users in Q1 2012.
Opera Mini, first launched in 2005, intended for basic feature 
phones with Java script technology. Reached 169 million users 
in Q1 2012.
Opera Mobile, first launched in 2008, intended for smart 
phones. Reached approximately 25 million users in Q1 2012.
Opera Devices Software Development Kit (SDK), was de-
livered as a solution for Original Equipment Manufacturers 
(OEMs) of devices since 2005, intended for a variety of Internet 
devices, such as TVs, game consoles and tablets (Annual report 
2005). 
For the last 2-3 years Opera has become a particularly inter-
esting actor within mobile web browsing in Africa and other 
emerging markets. To begin with, the Norwegian browser com-
pany found itself operating in Africa more or less unintention-
ally. That is to say, more to its surprise than as a conscious strat-
egy, a rather large user group was discovered in certain African 
nations, such as Nigeria and South Africa. These were areas 
where Opera had made no marketing or PR efforts (Interview 
with Opera’s CTO). In these emerging and less-developed re-
gions, the majority of people had limited access to PCs. Landline 
phone infrastructure was poorly built or absent in many regions. 
Mobile phone penetration, however, was widespread and there 
was a great desire to access the Internet. The mobile phone was 
an opportunity to connect. In January 2012, the mobile browser 
Opera Mini had a market share of 73% in Africa (Statcounter 
2012a), and was growing the market exponentially. 
4. Opera Mini - The Technical Solution
The mobile web browser Opera Mini has become particularly 
popular in Nigeria and other emerging markets, where most us-
ers rely on feature phones as their only device for accessing the 
Internet. Opera Mini is a product with properties that allow for 
compression of data traffic, making it possible to access Internet 
content and services on relatively poor and unstable networks 
(Interview with Opera’s former CTO).
4.1 Product features and technical details
The development of Opera Mini is described as a bit of a co-
incidence. In 2004, Opera competed for a contract to develop 
an application for a producer of mobile phones (OEM). But the 
application developed and offered by Opera was too technically 
advanced at the time, and the contract was awarded to a competi-
tor. Opera used advanced C++ programming language, whilst 
the OEM's phones could only support C programming language. 
The CEO explains that two Opera employees had to work from 
the OEM's office during the development period. They spent a 
great amount of time and effort to make the solution work on the 
OEM's phones, and eventually managed it, although by that time 
it was too late and another solution was selected for the contract. 
However, in working this way, disconnected from HQ activi-
ties and daily operations, the two Opera developers had to wait 
a week for deliveries from a subcontractor. Because they were 
not satisfied with the user experience from the mobile applica-
tions that existed at the time, they decided to spend the waiting 
time experimenting with a new proxy-based web application for 
mobile devices. In fact, Opera had considered this solution a few 
years earlier, but because of an intense industry discussion about 
whether the web or WAP would survive in the end, Opera's man-
agement decided not to follow this path. They feared a proxy-
based solution would position Opera closer to WAP technology, 
and that over time it could cannibalize their existing portfolio. 
However, when the two developers called the HQ in 2004 ask-
ing for permission to develop a proxy-based mobile application 
in their idle time, they received approval. Soon they shipped a 
small prototype to the HQ. It worked very well for a week, and 
everybody was enthusiastic and agreed it looked very interest-
ing. Because Opera was not awarded the contract for the OEM, 
there were no other plans or projects intended for the two Opera 
developers, and the management decided to let them continue 
experimenting with the proxy-based prototype. This project re-
sulted in the release of Opera Mini in 2005 (Interview with Op-
era’s CTO). 
This unique technology differentiated Opera Mini from 
other proxy-based solutions at the time, and was the result of 
Opera’s underdog position and financial situation in the early 
years. Compared to large and immensely rich competitors like 
Microsoft and Netscape, Opera was financially weak. While the 
competitors could hire an abundant number of developers for 
programming tasks, Opera had to make do with only a few. The 
former CTO explains how this became an advantage: 
When you only have a few developers, the source code, which 
is what you are programming, will necessarily become smaller 
than if written by many developers. Imagine, if you have many 
construction workers, you can build a large house, right? If you 
have only a few workers, you have to rely on building a smarter 
and smaller house. Therefore, when it became clear that devices 
other than computers would be equipped to do more than sim-
ple dedicated tasks, the Opera source code was already small 
enough to run on such devices. The fact that Opera had been 
poor became one of our strongest competitive advantages. Opera 
was lean and mean. (Interview with Opera’s former CTO).
Because the source code was small, Opera could take the 
full web browser, initially developed for personal computers, 
and make it available for mobile phones. In fact, Opera Mini 
functioned like a full web browser, while other solutions merely 
pretended to be web browsers. When users type in a uniform re-
source locator (URL), web browsers request the various content 
of that web page. The content then comes in a number of pack-
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ages that contain elements such as HTML, which is the structure 
of the page; CCS, which is the visual presentation; JAVA Script; 
pictures and maybe plug-ins. The information is delivered in 
chunks to the device that requested the web page and the brows-
er puts it all together by calculating where the different elements 
should be positioned on the screen and how it should be pre-
sented. The Opera former CTO uses the analogy of assembling 
and connecting many Lego bricks for describing the functional-
ity of a browser. The main difference from running a browser 
intended for personal computers is that, when using Opera Mini, 
the data processing takes place on one of Opera’s servers, rather 
than on the device (see Figure 1). The server compresses and 
translates the web page into a very limited language that Opera 
Mini understands and displays it on the screen (Interview with 
Opera’s former CTO). This makes Opera Mini lightweight in 
terms of memory consumption and efficient on a basic feature 
phone. In 2012, Opera Mini was compatible with over 3000 dif-
ferent mobile phone handsets. The browser provides up to 90% 
data compression that leads to a corresponding reduction of cost 
for both mobile operators and end users. In addition, it offers 
higher speed on weak or unstable networks. 
Opera Mini is continuously updating and improving with new 
functions, designs and technology. The software is known for be-
ing easy to use and can load several web pages at the same time. 
An address bar and a Google search bar are easily accessible at 
the top of the browser window. Further, users can customize and 
edit the menu at the front page, allowing them to individually 
define an unlimited number of direct URLs, also referred to as 
speed dials. Opera Mini emphasizes a user-friendly experience, 
and formatting technology has been  used to avoid impractical 
horizontal scrolling of web pages. Recently Opera launched the 
Opera Mini 7 Smart Page. It enables a smartphone feel on basic 
feature phones (Interview with Opera’s business controller).
4.2 Combinations and interdependencies
Opera Mini is only relevant if used in combination with con-
tent on an operator network and on a device (see figure 2). The 
success of any web browser depends on the Internet for content 
that is interesting from a user perspective. The browser is simply 
the medium for accessing information, and without interesting 
content no one would need the features the browser provides. 
It is in Opera’s interest to improve the way content is displayed 
and presented. Therefore, educating developers who create, de-
sign and provide content has been a priority. For example, Opera 
has worked to spread knowledge about web standards and the 
newest technology amongst students on campuses all over the 
world through their Education Program. Opera employees have 
attended and arranged various seminars and events for develop-
ers to encourage them to use the latest standards as well as test 
content on Opera platforms (Interview with Opera’s marketing 
manager). Because the formatting and availability of content 
Figure 1: Illustration of Opera Mini 7 Smart Page
Figure 2:  The structure of the mobile web in Nigeria and Opera’s role in it.
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is fundamental, Opera benefits from an Internet with common, 
open standards and has been an active member of organizations 
working towards this as its chief goal, such as W3C and OMA 
(www.opera.com). 
The use of Opera Mini also depends on infrastructure, and 
must be used in combination with a mobile operator’s network 
for accessing the Web. Cooperation and development of rela-
tionships with operators has been emphasized because they can 
influence the number of users that choose Opera Mini as their 
preferred web browser. Similarly, Opera Mini must be used with 
a device; a mobile phone handset. For obvious reasons the qual-
ity of the handset, the size, design and resolution of the screen 
display and the general usability of the phone will influence the 
experience associated with Opera Mini. It has been a priority 
to make Opera Mini compatible with as many handsets as pos-
sible, including basic feature phones. Further, cooperation with 
mobile OEMs and agreements about pre-installation of Opera 
Mini on the devices before they reach the end user, have been 
important for growth of the user base (Interviews with Opera’s 
former CTO, education manager and senior account executive).
The solution is activated whenever the end user intends to 
access Internet services or content. In this process, Opera Mini 
generates traffic on operators’ networks. And as it interacts di-
rectly with the end users, Opera is also in the position to influ-
ence the amount and type of data, services and web sites they 
choose to access or download (Interview with senior account 
executive). 
The user base is Opera’s most important asset and forms the 
basis for Opera’s ability to establish commercial deals and gen-
erate revenue from its customers. Because Opera Mini is free, 
the paying customers are not the end users, but rather Opera’s 
partners. Therefore, the main priority is distribution and users 
first, establishing widespread activation of the solution, and then 
finding ways to monetize from them (Interviews with the former 
CTO and business controller). 
4.3 Partners as part of distribution
The Opera Mini browser can be downloaded by the end user 
directly from Opera.com, from partners’ web sites or other 
third party online application stores, such as the iPhone App 
Store, Google Play, Blackberry App and Nokia’s Ovi Store. 
Another important distribution source is pre-installation of 
Opera Mini on handsets developed and sold by mobile OEMs. 
Traditionally, OEMs have paid a license for offering Opera 
Mini as an integrated solution on their devices, but lately Op-
era has changed its focus from OEMs as a source of revenue 
towards OEMs as a key source of distribution. In the annual 
report for 2011 it was reported that 40% of all Opera Mini 
users were related to OEM pre-installations and distribution. 
Important OEM partners include companies like Nokia, Sam-
sung and Huawei.
Opera Mini is either distributed as an Opera-branded, co-
branded or operator-branded product. The co-branded version, 
typically branded as an operator-Opera product, is prioritized 
and represents an important source of revenue. The distribu-
tion of these various browser versions can be easily managed 
from the HQ through identification of end users’ IP addresses. 
When distributed as a co-branded product, Opera Mini also 
benefits from various forms of local marketing and PR activi-
ties carried out by the operator (Interview with senior account 
executive). 
4.4 Partners as customers
Opera’s revenue stream, and its ability to monetize from end 
users, depends on partnerships, and particularly the number of 
deals signed with mobile operators. Opera’s focus has been to 
grow the user base on Opera Mini first. When there are adequate 
levels of user activity Opera will partner with mobile operators 
and convert the users into a co-branded version of Opera Mini 
as a way of generating license revenue. In August 2011, Opera 
signed a deal with AfriCom Group, including AfriCom Nigeria. 
Later the same year it signed a deal with YoungCom Nigeria. 
Both have implemented the co-branded version of Opera Mini. 
These two represent the main source of revenue for Opera in Ni-
geria (Annual report 2011, and interviews with Opera’s former 
CTO and business controller).  
Operators benefit from cooperation with Opera because the 
data compression technology allows Opera to offer cheaper data 
plans, while keeping its margins. Further, in a co-branding part-
nership, the operators are given the opportunity to present their 
own portal services through Opera Mini. They will normally 
have three or four reserved speed dials where they can distribute 
content and promote services. These links represent strong dis-
tribution power, and have proven capable of more than doubling 
traffic to the selected sites. This helps operators increase the av-
erage revenue per user (ARPU), and that is one of the key sell-
ing points when promoting Opera Mini (Interview with senior 
account executive).  
In addition to mobile operators, Opera has also entered a part-
nership with Google and earns revenue from displaying and pro-
moting the Google search bar. Search revenue is generated every 
time an end user conducts a search through Google (Annual re-
port 2011, and interview with former CTO).  
Table 1: Summary of important aspects of the solution  
Features Combinations Priorities
Data compression
Content
Open standards, W3C, 
OMA
High speed on 
unstable networks Educating developers
Low-weight/ 
memory capacity
Advertising revenue
Opera Mobile Store
Compatible with 
>3000 handsets Network/access
Partnerships with mobile 
operators, licensing rev-
enue from co-branding
User friendly 
interface
Devices and hand-
sets
Partnerships with mobile 
OEM’s, distribution 
through pre-installation
Smart phone feel 
Speed Dials/ direct 
links
Google search bar
Load multiple web 
pages
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4.5 Other sources of revenue 
Opera is increasingly focusing on advertisement as a future 
source of revenue. According to the former CTO, the mobile ad-
vertisement market is currently underdeveloped, mainly due to 
the difficulties of converting ad impressions into transactions. 
But at Opera the development of the market has been perceived 
as appealing for a while, and in 2010 the company bought the ad 
mediator AdMarvel. Revenue from advertisements is based on 
impressions or clicks  (Interview with former CTO).
Opera has also launched its own Mobile Store, and expects to 
generate revenue directly from the end users through downloads 
of various applications. The app store was the 5th largest in the 
world in February 2012, and offered more than 55,000 free or 
pay-to-download applications.
5. The specific context of the case: Nigeria 
The wild, wild West. Anarchy put into system. A cultural mega 
bomb with an energy for business that knows no limits. 
The descriptions of Nigeria are colourful. The country has 
been described as extremely complex, maybe the most complex 
nation in Africa. It is the most populated nation in Africa and 
as diverse as a continent. Rich from oil and with more than 165 
million inhabitants, Nigeria has been described as the prime eco-
nomic engine of the entire African continent. Nigeria is also a 
country of vast differences. There are 250 languages and 400 
dialects, numerous tribes and people groups, conflicts and deep 
social inequalities. The dominating ethnic groups, Yoruba, Hau-
sa and Ibo, are very large and comprise many millions. In geo-
graphical terms diversity is also present with the Sahara desert 
and the Sahel in the north, to the savannah, tropical rain forest, 
swamp, and the Atlantic coast in the southwest (Interviews with 
Opera’s project leader, Kristiansen and Rønning).
The social inequalities and differences create unrest. On the 
surface the conflict appears religious, but underneath there is 
a social conflict that is neither simple nor streamlined. Differ-
ences between the north and the south have torn the nation for 
decades, and are related to natural resources and the status of 
people groups. The coastline with the Niger Delta is in the south-
western region and is known for its extractive industries in oil 
and gas. The north is inland, partially desert, but people here 
have had the privilege of controlling the army. A power balance 
between the south and the north has been an issue for a long time 
and Chi Nwosu (project leader in Nigeria) finds that Nigerians 
never have had a sense of unification or nation building. Nige-
rians are known for engaging in fellowship from a social stand-
point. There is brotherhood, not nationhood. It is more important 
to take care of oneself, the family and the tribe (Interviews with 
Opera’s project leader, Kristiansen and Adegboye).
5.1 Infrastructure
In terms of infrastructure, the heavily populated country is expe-
riencing underdevelopment and instability in many forms. The 
electrical grid has been poorly maintained, meaning that each 
household must acquire a generator to secure a reliable supply. 
The same goes for sewage and water. The government has not 
delivered on its obligations and is perceived to be largely cor-
rupt. Although the government spends almost 40% of the GDP, 
according to Chi Nwosu, it has relatively little to show for it in 
terms of benefits to taxpayers. The only exception is subsidized 
fuel (Interviews with Opera’s project leader and Kristiansen).
5.2 Growth and employment
In Africa, Nigeria was amongst the 10 nations with the highest 
growth of GDP during 2010 and 2011. According to the Afri-
can Development Bank (2012), Nigeria’s economic growth was 
robust in 2011. While being dominated by its extractive indus-
tries, growth was mainly driven by non-oil sectors such as tele-
communications, construction, wholesale and retail, hotel and 
restaurant services, manufacturing and agriculture. But despite 
economic growth, poverty is widespread. Unemployment rates 
rose from 21.1% in 2010 to 23.9% in 2011 (IMF 2012), and are 
especially high amongst the young: 37.7% of 15-24 year olds 
are outside the labour market; one of the highest unemployment 
rates in sub-Saharan Africa. Social indicators in health and edu-
cation also remain weak (African Development Bank 2012). 
5.3 ICT and Mobile networks in Nigeria
The mobile phone in Africa is a wonderful story. What Africa 
needed was to jump over all the traditional ICT stages and go 
straight to the latest one. (Interview Kristiansen)
The majority of African nations have never been spoiled with 
infrastructure, regardless of category. Fixed phone lines have 
been weakly deployed. And with regards to ICT infrastructure, 
statistics from 2011 still showed single digit percentage numbers 
for Internet and mobile broadband penetration. Mobile broad-
band had reached a penetration of 4% and less than 1% of the 
population was served with fixed broadband (ITU 2011). Still, 
much can happen within the ICT sector in the near future. With 
large mobile operators such as AfriCom and Crosscom, and with 
China’s activities on the African continent, things point in the 
direction of acceleration. 
The GSM network was introduced to Nigeria in 2001 with 
400,000 lines (subscriptions or phone cards). By 2011 this num-
ber had grown to more than 100 million lines. This makes Nige-
ria the largest and fastest growing telecom market in Africa, and 
one of the top ten fastest growing worldwide. Leading national 
operators are AfriCom, Airtel, YoungCom, Globacom, Starcom-
ms, Mtel, Visafone, Zoommobile and Multilinks (Interview with 
Longe, Nigerian Times 2011).
Several individuals have two or three phone lines, so say prob-
ably 40-60 million of Nigerians have access to a mobile phone. 
That means there are still about 100 million Nigerians who don’t 
have a phone. There is still much room for growth. (Interview 
with Longe)
The lack of a fixed infrastructure in Nigeria makes the mobile 
network all the more significant. Mobile is the default mode of 
communication, and also the sole point of Internet access for 
many (Interview with Adegboye). Mobile phones can be afford-
ably purchased compared to a laptop, and at a wide price range. 
A basic phone is priced at about 12 USD (1800 NGN), and those 
with Internet browsing capabilities start at 30 USD (4500 NGN). 
Mobile handsets have become readily available to the large mid-
dleclass (Interviews with Oyetimein and Chi Nwosu).
Recently, in June 2012, the four major operators in Nige-
ria were fined by the Nigerian Communications Commission 
(NCC) for poor quality of service. 
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5.4 Cybercrime
Nigeria is heavily associated with letter scams, so-called 419 
letters. These scams and criminal online activity are stopping le-
gitimate Nigerians from engaging in international trade. PayPal, 
for instance, has blocked the whole nation. The account used in 
London by Co-founder of CcHUB, Femi Longe, was blocked in 
Nigeria without explanation:
Imagine stopping 160 million people from engaging in buying 
and selling on the Internet because they happen to be located 
in a specific country. That’s apartheid if you ask me (Interview 
with Longe).
Several respondents claim the stigma of Nigeria as a nation 
of cybercriminals is old and fading. They recognize criminals 
are there, but argue that in recent times there has been a trend 
towards using mobile technology for good ends. Besides, Ni-
gerians are taking active measures to stop letter scamming. The 
crowd-sourced repository Wayopedia (Wayopedia.org) is cur-
rently being developed by a team of developers at the CcHUB in 
Lagos and has been designed to detect and prevent email scams 
(Interviews with Adegboye and Longe).
6. The growth of Opera Mini in Nigeria
6.1 User growth first 
I wish I could say that we had a long-term and systematic plan 
prior to entering a market like Africa, but it was not exactly like 
that. (Interview with former CTO)
Opera had developed Opera Mini, a product that could be 
used on networks with low or variable quality and capacity, and 
was able to provide a better user experience compared to other 
solutions on the market. The former CTO at Opera explains 
that when Opera Mini was first released in Norway in 2005, it 
achieved moderate success with a few thousand downloads. In 
2006, it was released globally and grew slowly but steadily for a 
while. Then it suddenly exploded in such geographical areas as 
Russia and Indonesia, and later Nigeria and other emerging mar-
kets. Employees at the HQ describe the uptake and 
growth in these emerging markets as surprising be-
cause Opera had no employees working in these ar-
eas, nor any marketing campaigns or other activities 
directed towards these users. In fact, these potential 
markets were not even on the radar at the time; Op-
era had its hands full elsewhere. The US was a par-
ticular area of focus and investments, and resources 
were poured into this region. But it proved diffi-
cult to gain a strong foothold there. All the strong 
competitors, Chrome, Safari, Internet Explorer and 
Mozilla, were located like pearls on a string along 
the US West Coast from Canada in the north to Mexico in the 
south, making it difficult for Opera to enter. Success evolved 
more naturally in other parts of the world, in regions where 
competitors had no technologically suitable solution or local 
presence (Interview with former CTO).
In 2008 (SMW 2009/01), Opera discovered something spec-
tacular was going on in Africa without having lifted a finger to 
achieve it. Nigeria stood out: 
At one point we heard about a guy in Nigeria who had opened 
a local store, offering people Internet on their phone for one dol-
lar. All he did was download and install  Opera Mini. We knew 
something was going on! (Interview with former CTO)
A few Nigerian users had already discovered Opera Mini 
back in 2006, but in 2008 the number of monthly active users 
began growing rapidly, from 10,684 in January to 189,000 a year 
later. In January 2010, more than one million users were regis-
tered (Opera user statistics – See figure 4). Similar growth was 
seen earlier in Indonesia, and the former CTO explained how 
Opera could now make use of their experiences from that region: 
We knew what to do. When it took off in Indonesia, we imme-
diately hired staff dedicated to the development of the area, and 
immediately started to identify mobile operators and opportuni-
ties for doing business. And, because Opera Mini had become 
immensely popular, partnerships and commercial deals could 
be established quite rapidly. We did the same in Africa! This 
method of user growth first, and then business development, has 
become one of Opera’s most powerful business models. It means 
to first establish a consumer product with many dedicated users 
and then seek potential partners who are already doing business 
based on these users, proposing: Why don’t we do something 
together? (Interview with former CTO)
Several factors were mentioned by Opera employees as con-
tributory to the unexpected uptake and popularity of Opera Mini 
in Nigeria. First, a partnership with Nokia dating back to 1999 
(Interview with former CTO) resulted in an agreement in 2006 
about pre-installing Opera Mini on their high volume Series 
40 (Annual Report 2006) and Series 60 handsets. Completely 
out of Opera’s control, these phones were distributed in Nige-
ria and other African nations, and as of 2008 Opera began reg-
istering Opera Mini users on these handsets (SMW 2008/09). 
Opera could monitor this data as it is registered on its servers 
(Interview with Business Controller Opera). With Opera Mini 
pre-installed as Nokia’s default browser, the ability to activate 
Opera Mini was easily available for end users. Based on num-
bers from Opera’s SMW report from September 2008, it seems 
evident that Opera Mini was particularly popular when used in 
combination with S40 and S60 Nokia phones. 
The second factor driving user activity in Nigeria is associ-
ated with the illegal hacking of the browser, particularly in 2010 
and 2011. According to Opera employees, some Nigerians found 
technical loopholes in the system that allowed them to browse 
Figure 3: Growth of Opera Mini users in Nigeria, from 2008-2012
No Handset Series No Handset Series
1 Nokia 311c S40 6 Nokia 3230 S60
2 Sony Ericsson K750i N/A 7 Nokia 6300 S40
3 Nokia 2626 S40 8 Nokia 5200 S40
4 Nokia 6070 S40 9 Nokia 2600c S40
5 Nokia N70 S60 10 Nokia 2630 S40
Table 2: List of the top 10 handsets used for accessing Opera Mini in Nigeria, 
September 2008 (SMW 2008/09). 
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for free. This was apparently very easy to do, and Opera Mini 
quickly became extremely popular. Usage boomed, but local 
operators were not pleased as they were losing profits, and Op-
era found ways to stop the exploitation (Interviews with busi-
ness controller and CTO). It is uncertain exactly how influential 
this has been for long-term user growth. Opera’s statistics show 
that when the technical loophole was closed the number of us-
ers immediately dropped, but soon recovered. Some employees 
explain the loophole as important, and argue that the users had 
gotten acquainted with the browser (Interview with business 
controller). Others, such as the former CTO, are of the opin-
ion that this has been a neutral factor over time, that booming 
growth would happen anyway, and that the hacking just made 
the graphs more volatile. He adds that the exploitation of opera-
tors’ networks through Opera Mini has been a more pronounced 
problem in Nigeria than other regions (Interview with former 
CTO). 
Third, the emergence of social online networks is pointed to 
as a possible influential factor. The former CTO explains that 
his impression is that Facebook, Opera Mini and several other 
service providers simultaneously diffused and gained popular-
ity. Because Facebook was dependent on a carrier, and Opera 
Mini was dependent on content and services, the two are seen as 
complementary. It is believed that they mutually reinforced the 
usage and diffusion of each other (Interview with former CTO). 
A fourth factor points to the fact that mobile phones became 
relatively cheap and that mobile infrastructure had improved as a 
result of Chinese actors in Nigeria. Lately, they have subsidized 
construction of mobile towers and distributed cheap handsets as 
a part of their strategy to acquire resource extraction rights. The 
mobile handset producer, Huawei, is mentioned as influential. 
This is a complex value chain that contributes to favourable con-
ditions for mobile services, such as Opera Mini (Interview with 
former CTO).    
The last and most important factor mentioned by Opera man-
agers in determining user growth is the unique technology behind 
Opera Mini. It is strongly believed that the compression feature 
that helps users save up to 90% on data traffic and improves 
speed has created a strong word of mouth effect (Interviews with 
former CTO, education manager and marketing manager):
I believe Opera became big in Nigeria independently of what 
Opera employees did to systematically grow that market. Opera 
Mini became a success because it is a fantastic product, and be-
cause there is a good fit with the market characteristics in Nige-
ria. Opera succeeded because of the product, not because Opera 
implemented a clever market strategy. (Interview with former 
CTO) 
We will come back to this statement in the discussion of the 
case.
6.2 Business development, staff allocation and early 
work in the region  
When user growth was recognized as substantial and interesting 
in Nigeria, a handful of people within sales and marketing were 
allocated to the development of this region. There already were 
employees at the office with experience from Africa, and they 
could now make use of their aptitude and network in the region 
(Interview with former CTO). In the beginning, employees dedi-
cated to the African markets were located at the HQ, but later 
Opera could also recruit employees locally.
Early work in the region focused on establishing deals and 
partnerships. The former CTO explains that to be able to gen-
erate revenue from the rapidly growing Opera Mini user base, 
Opera had to develop relationships, and eventually partnerships, 
with mobile operators in the region. A Scandinavian based in 
South Africa was hired in January 2011 to focus on sales in the 
Middle East and Africa. He initiated several new deals in Africa, 
but left after only one year. Today, Africa is the place with the 
highest concentration of new Opera deals in the world, and the 
Scandinavian was replaced by a local person to keep the heat 
up in these markets (Interviews with former CTO and education 
manager). 
The senior account executive at Opera, responsible for two 
global operator agreements, explains that signing an operator 
deal can take from one to three years. If it is a group deal the 
process can be especially lengthy, as those deals are more com-
plex, include more stakeholders and numerous other aspects that 
need to be considered before a deal can be signed. 
In Africa, the major mobile operator, AfriCom Group, was in-
teresting as a potential partner, being one of the largest operators 
on the continent, with operations in 21 African and Middle East 
countries and more than 150 million subscribers. An agreement 
with the AfriCom Group about offering the co-branded Opera 
Mini browser was signed in August 2011, including the Nigerian 
AfriCom subsidiary. The senior account executive explains how 
this deal came about: 
In this specific case we actually signed a deal with the Afri-
Com South Africa subsidiary first, in December 2010. This part-
nership turned out to be a success, creating hype internally in the 
organization. We had a parallel dialogue with the group before 
we launched with South Africa, but this was the trigger needed 
to progress with the group deal. 
When there were enough users and revenue to support it, the 
deal with AfriCom Group was signed and several new employ-
ees were hired (Interview with business controller). Shortly after 
the AfriCom Group had signed, Opera, in the fourth quarter of 
2011, signed a deal with YoungCom Nigeria (Interviews with 
education manager, PR and communication manager, and mar-
ket coordinator). 
Both the senior account executive and the marketing manager 
pointed to the fact that, though a global frame agreement was 
signed with an operator group, there is no automatic implemen-
tation of this agreement by the subsidiaries. But there is a man-
date from the group that cooperation is favoured. The structure 
of the deal, and consequently the revenue potential, are based on 
the number of end users of the co-branded browser. Therefore, 
the team of people dedicated to the African market work to make 
sure the agreement is operationalized.
The account team develops deployment plans, technical and 
practical plans describing how to introduce the co-branded ver-
sion of Opera Mini, and the education manager sets up a go-to-
market package and assists the partners in marketing the solu-
tion. The Norwegian managers travel extensively to meet with 
product managers and marketing representatives in these com-
panies. Often specialists from various parts of the organization 
and the colleagues on the ground are also consulted (Interviews 
with senior account manager and the education manager). 
The education manager’s main responsibility is to assist the 
operators in growing the user base and data traffic on the brows-
er. She describes her role interacting with partners in Nigeria as a 
type of consultant, and spends her time advising partners on how 
to best market Opera Mini. Important activities include suggest-
ing new tactical strategies or marketing campaigns, and advising 
on how to grow mobile internet penetration in general. She em-
phasizes the importance of finding ways of aligning their goals 
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with the partners’ priorities. But, it can be challenging at times: 
You really have to be aware of your position. We’re not there 
to demand anything from the partners, we are there to make their 
job of making the Opera Mini co-branded project a success as 
easy as possible. 
 …we have to come up with other ideas. I think we have to 
keep in mind that we always have to provide value. Opera Mini 
is just a part of their portfolio and there are other projects that 
might take priority at times. So what we do is that we try to stay 
relevant. We can provide useful research, in terms of who the us-
ers are, or we can come up with some interesting strategies that 
they hadn’t thought about. And, we understand that they will get 
back to us when the time is right for them, which is not always 
immediately. If we keep pushing too much it is bad for the rela-
tionship. (Interview with education manager)
The group deals regarding establishing common goals with 
partners are particularly important. When Opera has secured 
buy-in from the group, the local Op-Cos will automatically have 
incentives to invest in marketing and promotion of Opera Mini. 
Still, it often requires huge amounts of time and effort to make 
partners implement recommended campaigns; it can take six 
months or even a year. But when it eventually goes live in the 
market it can be highly valuable. A recent example from one of 
the African group partnerships is:  
The AfriCom Group is currently running a campaign where 
they promote a co-branded version of Opera Mini, It runs on 
CNN and MTV and all sorts of TV and radio channels. This 
is the result of one of our marketing plans that were defined in 
September last year. It has slowly materialized. (Interview with 
senior account executive)
The partner marketing initiative is not only focused on how 
to promote the product, it is also about advising the partners on 
how to package and price the solution. In certain African coun-
tries data pricing is still very high, which hinders mass-market 
adoption. This is the case in a lot of markets worldwide, and the 
partner marketing department strives to share good case stud-
ies from markets that have adopted affordable and successful 
pricing strategies. A data plan or data package could imply that 
the operator offers, for example, 100 MB of data traffic, 100 
SMS and 100 minutes of calls or limitless browsing monthly at 
a fixed price. Nigeria is a market with much potential regard-
ing implementation of data packages. Opera’s experience is that 
strategic pricing is essential to increase penetration, and opera-
tors in developing regions are often interested in exploring these 
possibilities. The Opera partner marketing team attempts to ac-
celerate this process by discussing the operators’ current pricing 
strategies and suggesting adjustments based on successful case 
studies in other markets:
I always focus a lot on suggesting these data packages, and I 
see that they often get picked up quite quickly. It helps that we 
can provide examples from other markets with similar situations 
and shows the success of pricing strategies there. I believe that 
this is often perceived as very valuable input, especially when 
the operator is only beginning to discover the possibilities of 
growing their mobile Internet user base. (Interview with educa-
tion manager)
Through offering dedicated data packages, meaning that the 
data package is only valid when used with the Operator-Opera 
Mini browser, the operators can lower their prices, keep their 
margins and increase the number of users. This is good for the 
operators because both traffic and revenue increase. It is good 
for Opera because license revenue increases with the number of 
users, and for the users it means better and cheaper access to the 
Internet. This is only one example of the pricing strategies that 
Opera proposes for its partners (Interview with senior account 
manager, education manager and marketing manager). 
The former CTO explains that he believes Opera's business 
model is strong when it comes to establishing operator deals, but 
that it is hard to monetize directly from users. This particularly 
applies to emerging markets like Nigeria, but it is also widely 
known in the industry that monetizing directly from users is a 
challenge in any market. Still, the users are what make Opera 
interesting to business partners, and therefore it is always about 
users first. Finding ways to monetize and generate business 
comes second. 
The cooperation between Opera and its partners in Nigeria of-
fers several practical and cultural challenges to overcome. First, 
it is geographically distant from the HQ and since Opera does 
not have an office in the region a lot of travelling is required to 
ensure smooth implementation of technical and marketing solu-
tions. Very often the operators require considerable support and 
guidance, which is provided through the Partner Marketing pro-
gram. Opera managers sometimes travel more than 40 hours just 
for one meeting! Another natural consequence of the distance is 
that local knowledge is limited at the HQ and cultural issues can 
arise in the interface between employees at Opera and partners 
in Nigeria (Interviews with senior account manager and educa-
tion manager). 
The environment in general is tougher in Nigeria: In Nigeria 
life is just tougher. It’s a culture where you have to be strong to 
make it! It’s an environment where nothing comes easy. Electric-
ity is unstable and traffic in Lagos is hell, which makes everyday 
life much more difficult. You really have to be a strong person 
to succeed. It’s not a quiet culture. And of course that translates 
into business as well. It’s very straightforward,  (Interview with 
education manager)
The operators are very different. Doing business with an es-
tablished operator that has been in the market for a long time is 
very different from working with a younger and smaller com-
pany. It also depends on their target audience. An operator that 
targets the youth market is going to respond to ideas differently 
than an operator that targets a broader group of the population 
(Interview with education manager).
6.3 Creating personal relationships 
Creating personal relationships is seen as important for the suc-
cess of partnerships with operators. Previously Opera found 
that it signed deals in many countries, but implementation of 
the deals proved difficult. Companies were interested, signed 
the deal, and the product was launched, but often other proj-
ects took priority. The operator saw the need for the product, but 
they needed to be supported, engaged and inspired. This was the 
backdrop for the creation of the partner marketing department 
more than three years ago (Interviews with education manager 
and marketing manager).
Meeting in person makes it easier to convey certain difficult 
technical or marketing solutions, and Opera employees get a 
better sense of the local market conditions. The tone and rela-
tionships with different contacts vary; often there is an informal 
tone, but it is important to adapt to the situation: 
You can sense how valued you are. There are people you 
feel very comfortable to contact on Skype, for example, just to 
bounce ideas back and forth, and in other cases the relationship 
is more formal. You simply adapt your communication style to 
the type of relationship that you have with the partner. It’s about 
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awareness and common sense, really. (Interviews education 
manager, marketing manager)
When working with a partner on a campaign there is often 
frequent contact between the manager and the contact person 
at the partner company, and the relationship develops. The re-
lationship might be significantly strengthened, especially if the 
campaign is successful. But if the contact person moves on to 
another position, the relationship with the new contact has to 
be built from scratch (Interviews with education manager and 
marketing manager).
You work with individuals and it all depends on the relation-
ship with that person. In the long term that means that you have 
to build relationships over and over again, and you have to make 
yourself relevant over and over again to different people.
6.4 Knowledge sharing and learning
Opera provides its partners with a lot of information and data. 
In particular, it collects and provides statistics from Opera’s 
servers, such as user reports, handsets used or the most popu-
lar web sites. These are highly valuable data for the operator 
who can use it for targeted promotion and as a means to better 
understand their users. In addition, because Opera works with 
many operators around the world, it can also share knowledge 
about strategies and tactics that have worked in other markets. 
The senior account executive explains that it has been a great 
advantage for him to work as an account manager for two ma-
jor operator partners, as he can pick up best practices from one 
partner and implement them for the other partner. Opera does 
not share operator-specific intelligence with its competitors, but 
uses best practice sharing within group deployments to a great 
extent. By documenting success and learning from each market-
ing campaign and deployment plan, Opera can effectively share 
them with other operator companies within the groups. This has 
proved highly valuable for Opera’s partners (Interviews with 
senior executive managers, education manager and marketing 
manager). 
Opera also uses the operators’ statistics, experience and 
knowledge about the user base to adapt and develop the product. 
The recent Opera Mini 7 Smart Page was created with emerging 
market users in mind. It is a product version that takes into con-
sideration that Opera has many users in markets where feature 
phones are still widespread, such as Nigeria and Africa (Inter-
view with education manager).
6.5 Opera in Nigeria - Playing the intermediary role
There is only one person operating out of Lagos for Opera. Four 
areas of particular focus are: 
1. Attend local events and develop relationships with users 
and developers. 
2. Work with local content providers, and enter partnerships to 
have local content available by default on Opera Mini. 
3. Work with local OEMs, for example the regional Samsung 
office, and encourage them to push phones with Opera Mini pre-
installed. 
4. Build good relationships with mobile operator partners. 
They have big marketing budgets and the scope to do major 
campaigns on TV and radio. Encouraging them to promote the 
Opera Mini partnership is important, because it is good for the 
Opera brand to be associated with the big brands in local mar-
kets.
The person has an intermediary role and interacts greatly with 
both Opera HQ and Opera’s partners in Africa (Interview with 
market coordinator).
Although the market coordinator has no formal responsibil-
ity for sales, he gets involved in the partner deals from the very 
beginning, despite the fact that the deals can be very technical. 
With new deals it is important to build trust, and he describes his 
role in this setting as ‘to manage cultural nuances’. By playing 
the intermediary role, he can step in and prevent misunderstand-
ings and miscommunication or clean up if the deed is already 
done (Interview with market coordinator).  
6.6 Building a local business network
From previous work and experience, the market coordinator 
was able to bring to the table a broad professional network in 
Kenya, South Africa and Ghana, in addition to his home country 
Nigeria. Despite the fact that his contact network was not pri-
marily related to the ICT industry, he claims these contacts have 
been very valuable:
The market coordinator lists four arenas where he builds his 
professional network and at the same time can display a local 
presence for Opera. The two first arenas are online resources; 
(1) Linkedin.com is used extensively for professional contacts, 
(he has more than 500 business contacts); (2) Twitter is another 
platform extensively used for similar purposes; on the ground 
in Lagos, (3) the CcHUB has been an important physical place 
to make contacts within the ICT industry; (4) technology events 
and conferences are important opportunities to network with 
content providers and nurture the relationship with developers 
and end users. He makes sure to attend as many events as pos-
sible and quickly counts participation at six events during the 
first five months of 2012: Mobile Web in South Africa, Confer-
ence on Mobile Web East Africa in Kenya, Conference on Mo-
bile Web West Africa in Nigeria, AfriCom events in Nigeria and 
South Africa as well as a Safaricom event in Kenya (Interview 
with market coordinator).  
6.7 Perceptions about the future 
Nigeria is seen as an important market for Opera. It was the 
fourth largest nation in April 2012 in terms of Opera users 
worldwide, and is rapidly growing. In 2012, Opera had a goal 
of reaching 500 million monthly active users globally within 
a couple of years (nearly doubling their number of users), and 
therefore fast growth rates are even more interesting than the 
actual number of users. It is important to have local people on 
the ground that contribute with local knowledge and can pick up 
market trends quickly. It is especially valuable for Opera to have 
local employees attend partner meetings. And it can mean a lot 
for the users.
If you can give people Internet it is fantastic! When MIT for 
instance made the 100 dollar computer, we were supportive, but 
we knew that we could give people the entire Internet on their 
phones for free. What do you need a 100 dollar computer for 
then? We felt what we did for welfare was much greater than 
many other initiatives. And that felt good, it was a good fit with 
the company values and DNA. (Interview with former CTO) 
But, in the end Opera must depend on making money. And 
several challenges are in the pipeline, namely increased com-
petition and maintaining high levels of distribution. The old 
partner, Nokia, launched its own browser (Interview with busi-
ness controller). Another challenge is the flow of Chinese mo-
bile handsets into emerging markets. This is important for Opera 
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because it needs to make Opera Mini compatible with all these 
new handsets. There is a large grey market in Africa. In addition, 
there are Chinese companies that deliver browsers that are quite 
similar to the Opera Mini set up, some of which are growing 
their market shares in certain African countries, and Opera is 
closely following the development (Interview with senior ac-
count executive). 
7. Analyzing three specific relationships
The case illustrates how Opera has pursued opportunities in Ni-
geria. More as a coincidence, rather than from strategically fo-
cused efforts, user activity began to rapidly emerge. Figure 4 il-
lustrates how the network evolved in Nigeria from 2008 to 2012. 
Clearly, the network is much more complex than rendered in this 
graphical representation, but it serves as a simplified picture of 
how the network developed. During this period Opera became 
increasingly involved in various activities and relationships in 
Nigeria, and the network has become more organized and inter-
twined due to all systematic efforts. 
Here we will analyze three different relationships within the 
case from a network perspective; each has been selected so that 
together they explain technical, economic and social dimen-
sions. The three layers of the ARA model will be discussed, and 
dominating layers will be identified for each of the analyzed re-
lationships. 
7.1 Opera HQ ←→ Opera in Nigeria: The technical 
dimension 
The relationship between the Opera HQ in Norway and Op-
era in Nigeria is heavy with actors, resources and activities on 
both sides. The relationship is mostly about coordinating and 
fine-tuning Opera’s local presence, relevance and economic 
interests. In this section we will analyze in particular how the 
relationship came about and how it has developed by analyz-
ing resource ties and constellations (see figure 5).
Opera in Nigeria is primarily represented by the technical 
solution Opera Mini, and it was initially made available on-
line. Besides investing heavily in the Opera Mini and making 
it available for free, almost no activities or investments by the 
HQ were made to announce this to Nigerians. Resources and 
activities were allocated and prioritized elsewhere. To the HQ’s 
surprise, activation of the Opera Mini by users in Nigeria be-
gan to emerge, and escalate. The solution had been pre-installed 
on a number of Nokia phones, and out of Opera’s control or 
without its knowledge, they were distributed across Africa. Ni-
gerian users found Opera Mini useful; it was compatible with 
the equipment they already had available and gave them access 
to attractive Internet content and services. Furthermore, Opera 
Mini worked well with the existing infrastructure, improving 
efficiency and speed on local mobile networks. Because of re-
duced Internet costs, data traffic significantly increased as more 
people could now afford it. Opera Mini was quickly embedded 
and became part of the business landscape. To a large degree one 
can point to a surprisingly good initial fit between Opera Mini 
as a technical solution and the existing resource constellation. 
It seems obvious that the technical dimensions related to the 
solution were significant to Opera’s growth in Nigeria. But be-
cause of interdependencies in the network, the technical solu-
tion itself was not the only resource of importance. We will look 
deeper into three specific resource ties to understand more of 
the substance in the relationship; (A) investments by others in 
relation to the solution, (B) user activity in relation to mobile 
operator’s revenue model and (C) HQ experience in relation to 
the ‘new’ co-branded Opera Mini (see figure 5). 
Investments in technical equipment and infrastructure already 
made by others were fundamental for the existence of Opera’s 
solution (A), and Opera could never have made these invest-
ments itself. The existing infrastructure created opportunities for 
Opera; its Opera Mini could run on top of and take advantage 
of the large investments made by others. Making Opera Mini 
Figure 4: Development of Opera’s network in Nigeria from 2008 – 2012, with Opera as the focal unit of analysis.
Figure 5: The resource constellation affecting Opera’s solution in  
Nigeria.
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available to users in Nigeria, therefore, required few resources 
from HQ. But a technical fit with the existing business land-
scape and high user activity were not enough to be of econom-
ic significance. Rather it was necessary for Opera to search for 
revenue opportunities within the constellation of resources. 
This process is characterized more by constraint. Because 
the investments in the network were made over a long period 
of time, and because of their scale, they enforced a certain 
amount of path dependency. The solution had to be adapted 
and modified to fit with the needs of local mobile operators. 
The co-branded Opera Mini, a ‘new’ solution with the capa-
bility of elegantly transferring existing users from the ‘old’ 
solution, was developed to fit the needs of both Opera and 
the mobile operators, enabling mutual economic benefits. This 
brings us to the next resource tie, user activity in relation to the 
operator’s revenue model (B). One can argue that the technical 
solution only serves to facilitate what can be seen as Opera’s 
actual solution – user activity. Data traffic generated by users 
is the core of the solution offered to Opera’s business partners 
– the mobile operators. Mobile operators face daily struggles 
to generate revenue from usage, and data traffic is becoming 
increasingly important. Therefore, user activity must be seen 
as an important business resource from a HQ perspective. One 
can then point to how the technical dimensions of the solution 
simply are fundamental pre-requisites for creating business and 
developing actor bonds and activity links to selected partners. 
The third, and final, resource tie is the HQ’s experience as a 
resource in relation to the new co-branded solution (C). The op-
erators do not have to partner with Opera; users of the solution 
will generate traffic on the operator’s network regardless. But 
together they can achieve increased use and make their respec-
tive resources more economically valuable. Opera HQ provides 
its partners with much experience and empirical evidence from 
other markets, as well as specialized knowledge and statistics. 
The introduction and modification of mobile data plans serves as 
an example of how this knowledge is used by partners. The HQ 
experience can be seen as a resource of both technical and more 
intangible character and is an integrated part of the co-branded 
solution. There is clearly a mutual adaptation and learning pro-
cess, and consequently this resource tie is one that requires a 
great deal of interaction on the two other layers: activities and 
actors. Thus, it is one of the resource ties in which Opera invests 
the most time and effort. 
Although tied together in a complex and interdependent con-
stellation of resources, it is not obvious that all parties will value 
each resource tie on the same scale or have the same perspec-
tive on how resources best fit together. As a consequence, de-
velopment and adaptation that has the potential to increase the 
accumulated value in the network may take a long time to be 
implemented or might never be implemented at all. 
7.2 Opera ←→ Partners: The economic dimension
The relationship between Opera and its partners is dominated 
by interaction between actors. When technical embeddedness of 
the solution was established, Opera had to search for opportu-
nities to create revenue streams. By providing the solution for 
free, it was still unsure how to transfer user activity into positive 
revenue streams. In this case, economic value was created from 
interaction and cooperation with other commercial actors in the 
market. This part of the analysis will deal with how revenue 
streams flow (see Figure 6) and how network interaction affects 
economic dimensions. 
There are currently two direct revenue opportunities for Opera 
in Nigeria; from partnerships with local mobile operators (A), 
and from advertisements through Google (B). The first generates 
the largest revenue stream and is particularly important. Because 
the operators can increase their own revenue streams by cooper-
ating with Opera, the relationship brings about mutual benefits, 
and the overall goals of growing users and data traffic are largely 
aligned. But, because the relationships with the two mobile op-
erators are relatively new (officially both have lasted less than a 
year at the time of the study) they contain some level of uncer-
tainty. Opera employees explained how learning by doing is part 
of these actor bonds, and that building trust among individu-
als is critical for developing strong relationships and reaching 
economic goals. But as in most firms, employees come and go 
at both Opera and the partners’ organizations. If bonds with in-
dividuals are crucial, turnover of employees may cause serious 
stress to the actor bonds. So, what effect will this have on the 
relationship? Can it offset the relationship as a whole? In some 
cases maybe, but if that were the typical pattern, there would not 
be many partnerships or collaborative efforts in business. In this 
case, the breach of an individual actor bond causes some delay 
or may slow down progress temporarily, but due to a number of 
individual actor bonds among the partners, the relationship as a 
whole is relatively unaffected. It is the individual actors’ collec-
tive efforts that define the relationship and facilitate the revenue 
streams in the network. In addition, activity links and resource 
ties further contribute to stabilizing the relationship. 
This does not mean that interaction between individual actors 
is of marginal importance. The process of adapting and growing 
the solution together, creating mutual value and a shared percep-
tion of success, makes the relationship more interdependent and 
stable. In this case it seems beneficial to facilitate for more fre-
quent interaction by moving actors closer together. For example, 
the physical location of Opera employees, close to the partners’ 
offices, allows for new forms of activities, communication and 
cooperation, and a deeper understanding of cultural and contex-
tual factors. 
However, the revenue stream does not depend only on the 
bond between Opera and the mobile operators. The operators 
themselves are dependent on other actors, particularly on a li-
cense controlled by the Nigerian government. As such, their 
relationship with the government will indirectly affect the po-
Figure 6: Revenue streams in Opera’s network in Nigeria in 2012.  
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tential revenue streams directed towards Opera in this market. 
But, in turn the government is dependent on cooperation if it 
wishes to maintain and increase the license income (C), while 
simultaneously making basic goods available to the general pub-
lic. This interdependence makes the network more stable than 
at first glance, and threats from the government about closing 
down base stations are not overwhelmingly credible. 
Opera also seeks to generate revenue from advertising through 
its browser start page and the Google search bar, but this rev-
enue stream is more difficult to stabilize. One reason could be 
contextual factors; whereas the mobile industry was somewhat 
developed at Opera’s point of entry, mobile advertisement has 
only recently begun to emerge. It is reasonable to assume that 
Opera can have an impact on the direction of this development 
by taking an active role, interacting with related actors early on 
and influencing the web of actors. Presumably, it will take time 
to develop the network and find a strategic place in it, and it will 
coevolve with the choices and decisions by others. Again, it will 
be a matter of learning, trial and testing. 
7.3 Opera in Nigeria ←→ Users: The social dimension
Finally, we will discuss the relationship between Opera in Nige-
ria and the users. Although consumers are not normally included 
in the IMP business network analysis, we find it relevant for this 
case. Activities by users are of fundamental importance because 
it creates commercial business opportunities for Opera. One can 
argue that the users in fact ‘produce” and ’supply’ activities and 
data traffic for Opera. From a conceptual point of view users 
can therefore be seen as suppliers, collectively supplying a key 
business resource. The relationship between Opera and users is 
dominated by the activity layer, and we will look specifically 
into social dimensions of the activity patterns of the case.
Opera in Nigeria, particularly represented by the solution, has 
become an integrated part of users’ activity patterns. Apparently, 
there is a good fit between the technical features of the solution 
and the Nigerian context. Initially, uptake and diffusion were en-
abled by users who needed to communicate more, with greater 
cost efficiency and over larger distances. Being able to contact 
and communicate easily with friends and family were basic so-
cial needs and activity links have become particularly important 
with regards to social media platforms. 
The growth and gradual development of commercial and in-
stitutional networks has emerged alongside social networks, al-
though this development seems more challenging and uncertain. 
As of now, young technology entrepreneurs are taking advantage 
of the solution, particularly for political purposes. Social media 
has brought increased transparency and political awareness. It 
is interesting to observe that when the solution has become em-
bedded in the existing activity pattern it seems to accelerate user 
activity and development of networks. Hence, it contributes to 
exponential growth of the value created and supplied in the net-
work from a business perspective. 
A number of activities are also performed by Opera as an ac-
tor. Local presence and direct online communication with users 
were emphasized. The solution has constantly been improved 
and updated based on user feedback and interaction. Activities 
related to supporting development of local content, as well as 
influencing data packages offered by the operators, has strength-
ened the relationship between Opera in Nigeria and users. The 
relationship is highly interdependent; Opera is dependent on the 
supply of activities and the mobile web has become an integrat-
ed part of users’ daily lives. Adaptations made to improve the 
social dimensions of user activity made the solution even more 
relevant and embedded in the local web of actors, resources and 
activities. 
8. Crucial network features
This case is a very rich network case, i.e. it describes the im-
portance and the function of direct connections for a business 
highly embedded into a business environment. We all know that 
people have personal connections and this case is just another 
example of that. But this case shows much more. All the existing 
business relationships in the case are also directly connected to 
other business relationships. What Opera is doing with Nokia in 
Finland influences what it can do in Nigeria or other parts of the 
world. This is due to the fact that products and technical solu-
tions are highly interrelated – embedded into each other. The use 
of the mobile phone is dependent on the possibilities of reaching 
the internet and the latter is dependent on both technical solu-
tions and content sources. In this way Opera is related to mobile 
operators as well as content providers such as Facebook. These 
direct connections give two different types of possibilities or re-
strictions for involved companies. First, it results in a specific 
network structure in each moment, which in the short run makes 
room for certain networking processes to exploit the given struc-
ture at the same time it excludes others. Opera is actively trying 
to do this in Nigeria through its marketing activities as well as 
undertaking complementary activities in some other countries. 
However, second, it also makes room for a certain number of 
networking processes trying to exploit changes in the specific 
structure. This is also a track followed by Opera, for example 
in the development of Opera Mini, where the company is trying 
to develop a new way to reach the internet from mobile phones. 
Together these two types of networking processes create some 
room for each of the involved companies to manoeuvre while si-
multaneously creating very distinct restrictions. Any actor must 
constantly adapt to the existing structure as well as continuously 
deciding what changes to support. If finding a positive solution, 
as Opera has done with the Opera Mini, it can quickly improve 
its position and if less successful, it can quickly go in a negative 
direction. 
The case is also interesting as it offers possibilities for identi-
fying the main reason for the existence of these direct connec-
tions. The resources used and developed are all systematically 
interrelated and embedded. The reason is that more or less all 
of them are ‘heterogeneous’ from an economic point of view, 
which means that their value is dependent on the resources with 
which they are combined. The value of the web browser is di-
rectly dependent on the features of the mobile phones as well as 
the development of Facebook. In the same way the characteris-
tics of the Opera Mini were, as the former CTO explains, also 
a consequence of Opera’s existing resources. The heterogeneity 
offers a large number of possibilities for developing single prod-
ucts or facilities to increase their value. This is also one main 
activity in which all the involved companies take part. One con-
sequence is that the actors develop the resources by designing 
specific interfaces with other resources; the resources become 
more or less embedded into each other. They become more pro-
ductive in certain combinations and this creates a specific struc-
ture in terms of value creation. The technical solutions, such as 
a product like Opera Mini, are not just “fantastic” in general as 
the CEO claimed, but it was “fantastic” in relation to the features 
of some of the existing resources. If these had developed dif-
ferently, which perfectly well could have happened, the result 
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would have been quite different. 
It is important to note that this does not only regard technical 
resources. The interface between technical and social as well as 
the interfaces between social resources can be developed in the 
same way (Baraldi & Strömsten 2006). This is also what Opera 
tries to work with in Nigeria in a general sense. The company is 
trying to become more closely connected to important dimen-
sions of the Nigerian society.
Consequently, resources are never developed in a neutral way 
in relation to other resources. They will always be developed in 
relation to each other – some in a positive and others in a nega-
tive way. This is the case for products such as the web browser 
and mobile phones as well as the web browser and Facebook. 
As a result, the involved companies develop in relation to each 
other, while some get closer, others move in opposite directions. 
Opera Software and the mobile operators in Nigeria move closer 
toward each other while Opera and Nokia have a more prob-
lematic development – some parts getting closer and some parts 
going in different directions (Nokia developing its own web 
browser ).
These connections can be used over time as when Opera ear-
lier learnt about connections in Indonesia and later uses this 
knowledge in Africa. The connections can also be used in re-
lation to place; what Opera learns about connections in South 
Africa is connected to and affects the development in Nigeria,
The case is especially interesting in terms of how a network 
affects the distribution of wealth in relation to economic returns. 
All relationships and the value creation they represent can not 
be transformed into money! The end users of the web browser 
are not paying for using it. Opera had many users in Nigeria 
before the company made any money from that, and then did so 
indirectly.  Connections between end users and mobile operators 
could help Opera gain revenue from the operators. It means that 
in many ways the money-making relationships are dependent on 
other relationships that are not money producers. 
This specific structure and how it affects the chance to make 
money points to an extremely important feature of all (?) net-
works. The division or distribution of monetary rewards is not 
directly related to value creation. There are two different pro-
cesses taking place at the same time. One is the value creation 
and the other is the division of rewards. These processes are 
probably related, but in a much more complicated way than we 
usually assume. It is an aspect of the networks that up to now we 
have neglected in our studies. 
9. Conclusions
From a strategic point of view the case gives reasons for some 
specific conclusions. Succeeding in Africa has been a troubled 
goal and difficult journey for many western companies, but in 
the case of Opera Software it initially came more or less uninten-
tionally. We described the growth of Opera in Nigeria, and from 
the analysis of the empirical data it seems clear that the main 
explanation builds on the characteristics of the network. It is not 
single events or single individuals that have been successful but 
some important network factors:
(1) Fit with the old: The strong initial adoption and growth of 
the solution in Nigeria can be accredited to its excellent fit with 
existing networks in terms of technical resources, investments 
made by others and social needs of users, rather than Opera’s 
role as an active business actor or its strategic plans. Embed-
dedness within the existing resource constellation in Nigeria 
facilitated for a larger, more complex business network and rein-
forced future growth and development. 
(2) Interacting factors: The story of Opera in Nigeria illus-
trates how growth strategies cannot be determined or controlled 
by individual business actors, but that much of the important 
factors for growth of innovations are co-created in networks of 
interrelated resources, actors and activities. The ability to both 
act on and react to events and processes in the network becomes 
particularly important. 
(3) Economic exploitation: Embeddedness and a good fit with-
in the user context was not enough for an economically interest-
ing innovation or exploiting the opportunity. Opera also had to 
find a position within the existing business network to turn users 
into profit. The main feature of the network is that all actors are 
dependent on each other if they seek to increase their individual 
revenue streams. The accumulated value is greater when work-
ing together. 
Time Magazine asked if the small browser company was crazy 
to give out their product for free. But by doing so, Opera could 
pursue alternative innovation paths and explore opportunities 
impossible to foresee or plan in detail. 
Finally and in summary, this business case is rather special 
from an IMP point of view as it deals with a business situation 
where
- no physical product is exchanged
- distribution is electronic rather than physical
- the product is given for free and someone else than the user 
has to pay
- the crucial role of end-users/consumers
- the value creation process is different from the division of 
rewards process.
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